

## Military Equipment Export Report

Report by the government of the Federal Republic of Germany on its policy on the export of conventional military equipment in the first half of 2018

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## Report by the government of the Federal Republic of Germany on its policy on the export of conventional military equipment in the first half of 2018

The Federal Government hereby submits the half-year report on exports of military equipment for the period from 1 January 2018 until 30 June 2018. This report is the fifth of its kind; the first one was presented on 15 October 2014 with licensing figures for the first half of 2014.

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The interim report fosters transparency in the field of the export of military equipment by providing information about the Federal Government's policies in this field before the end of the reference year. The same purpose is served by the regular practice of disclosing final decisions on licences by the Federal Security Council to the Economic Affairs Committee of the Bundestag. In this way, the Bundestag is provided with timely information about significant decisions by the Federal Government in the field of exports of military equipment. Information is provided not only about the nature, number and country of destination, but also about the German firms involved and the total volume of the export project, unless constitutionally protected interests prevent such disclosure.

Further to this, the Federal Government provides information about policy on military equipment exports in the context of answers to numerous questions from parliament. An overview (in German) of all inquiries from the parliamentary arena relating to the issue of exports of military equipment is available at <u>www.bmwi.de</u>.

## Government policy on exports of military equipment

The Federal Government is pursuing a restrictive and responsible policy on the export of military equipment. Decisions on licences for exports of military equipment are taken by the Federal Government on a case-by-case basis and in the light of the respective situation following careful scrutiny including consideration of foreign and security policy aspects. This process is based on the statutory requirements of the War Weapons Control Act, the Foreign Trade and Payments Act, the Foreign Trade and Payments Ordinance, and the Political Principles Adopted by the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany for the Export of War Weapons and Other Military Equipment of 2000 ("Political Principles", Annex 1), the Council Common Position of the EU defining common rules governing control of exports of military technology and equipment of 8 December 2008 ("EU Common Position", Annex 2) and the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT).

Special weight is given to observance of human rights in the country of destination. If there is sufficient suspicion that the military equipment will be misused for internal repression or other ongoing and systematic violations of human rights, a licence is not issued as a matter of principle.

The other criteria of the Political Principles and the EU Common Position are also always included in the scrutiny; these include:

- the compatibility of the export with international obligations, especially on the basis of decisions by the UN and the EU,
- the internal situation in the country of final destination,
- the preservation of regional peace, security and stability,
- the national security of the EU Member States and of friendly and allied countries,
- the behaviour of the recipient country with regard to the international community, as regards in particular its attitude to terrorism,
- the risk that the military technology or equipment will be diverted within the recipient country or re-exported under undesirable conditions, and
- the compatibility of the exports with the technical and economic capacity of the country of destination.

Each individual case is scrutinised giving consideration to all the circumstances, including Germany's foreign and security policy interests. Here, the Federal Government upholds its Alliance commitments and its responsibility for European and international security. Germany and its allies face great security policy challenges in view of numerous international crises and terrorist threats. Exports of military equipment which serve cooperation with our Alliance partners or help to equip them also uphold Germany's own security policy interests. This is also true of exports to third countries<sup>1</sup> which, for example, can help to secure borders or to tackle international terrorism in these countries. The Political Principles further stipulate that employment policy must not play a decisive role in the export of war weapons. This is a fundamental premise for all decisions on exports of military equipment taken by the Federal Government.

### Particularly strict rules for small arms exports

In internal and cross-border conflicts, by far the greatest share of human casualties are caused by the use of small arms and light weapons. National control measures tend to be underdeveloped in conflict areas. In many cases, the misuse of small arms by criminal or militant groups impedes economic and social development and frequently contributes to a violent escalation of conflicts. The Federal Government therefore applies particularly strict standards when issuing licences for small-arms exports to third countries.

In particular, the Principles Adopted by the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany for the Issue of Licences for the Export of Small and Light Weapons, Related Ammunition and Corresponding Manufacturing Equipment to Third Countries (Small Arms Principles, Annex 3) in March 2015 provide the basis for decisions on whether to issue export licences for small arms to third countries. A particularly strict approach is taken to the licensing of small arms exports to third countries. The Small Arms Principles contain three key elements:

- Licences are no longer normally issued for the export of technology and components which could be used for new manufacturing lines for small arms in third countries. This is intended to prevent the relocation abroad of entire production sites, which would undermine controls of small arms production.
- The export of small arms to third countries is normally only licensed in return for declarations by state recipients committing to destroy the old weapons to be replaced ("New for old" principle), or, if meeting a plausible increased need, to destroy the newly supplied weapons when they are subsequently decommissioned ("New, destroy when discarded" principle). The aim is that, where the equipment being used in a country of destination is being modernised, the small arms already there are to be prevented from ending up in the wrong hands.

• The export is made dependent on the declaration of end-use which must – going beyond the existing customary re-export clause – include an explicit commitment that the small arms and light weapons, related ammunition and manufacturing equipment will not be transferred in the country of destination to recipients other than those covered by the export licence without the approval of the Federal Government.

#### **Controlling end-use (post-shipment controls)**

Pursuant to the principles governing export control policy, licences for the export of military equipment are only issued if it has been ensured what the end-use of these goods will be in the country of final destination. Prior to the issuing of a licence, all the available information about end-use is thoroughly checked and assessed by the Federal Government. If there are doubts about whether the end-use is as stated, export applications will be rejected.

In addition to this, the Federal Government decided in July 2015 to introduce post-shipment controls for certain German exports of military equipment (Key principles for the introduction of post-shipment controls for German exports of military equipment, Annex 4) on a pilot basis, i.e. controls which can take place on the spot once the military equipment has been dispatched to the respective state recipient. The governmental recipients of small and light weapons and certain firearms (pistols, revolvers, sniper rifles) in third countries must now agree to a subsequent check on the end-use of the military equipment in the country of destination when the export licence is issued.

Corresponding post-shipment controls can be used to determine whether the countries of destination are adhering to their commitments in the end-use certificate, i.e. whether the exported weapons are actually received by and remain with the final recipient cited in it. If a country of destination violates the end-use certificate or refuses to permit on-thespot controls despite having agreed to them in the end-use certificate, in accordance with Figure IV No. 4 of the Political Principles it will basically be excluded from future exports of war weapons and other military equipment similar to war weapons.

In 2017, the first on-the-spot controls to verify the actual final destination of small arms were carried out at state recipients in India and the United Arab Emirates; the first half of

2018 saw the third such control take place in the Republic of Korea. None of the controls so far has revealed any problems. Further post-shipment controls are being prepared. The implementation of further controls depends on factors on which the Federal Government has no influence, such as the production or physical delivery of the military equipment. There can be considerable delays in this following the issuing of the export licence.

By introducing the post-shipment controls on a pilot basis, Germany is a pioneer, alongside just a few other countries, at European and international level. Germany is at present the only EU Member State to carry out such controls. Other EU Member States have since announced their desire to introduce similar verification.

### Arms Trade Treaty (ATT)

The Arms Trade Treaty defines minimum standards for trade in conventional weapons. It entered into force on 24 December 2014, and had 94 contracting parties in mid-2018. After the first Conference of States Parties in 2015 established the institutional basis, the second Conference of States Parties in 2016 set up working groups on the main challenges facing the ATT (universalisation, implementation, reporting and transparency). These were put on a permanent institutional footing by the third Conference of States Parties in 2017. Further to this, the Voluntary Trust Fund, which was largely driven by Germany, has been set up to assist states requiring support with the implementation of the ATT. The Trust Fund had received payments of €6.5 million from 14 countries by mid-2018. This has made it possible to successfully launch the first two funding cycles, and to make 25 grants of funding worth a total of €2.25 million. As the chair of the selection committee, Germany has played a key role in this process, and it was confirmed in this office for a further year at the fourth Conference of States Parties in Tokyo in August 2018. In most cases, the Federal Office for Economic Affairs and Export Control (BAFA) is helping to bring countries towards the ATT and its national implementation. German funding remains focused on universalisation, with the Federal Government pressing for this in bilateral dialogue and in the context of an EU project.

### **Current licensing figures**

This interim report provides information about decisions on licences in the period from 1 January 2018 until 30 June 2018. It contains an overview of the licences of exports of military equipment, broken down into EU countries, NATO and NATO-equivalent countries (Australia, New Zealand, Japan, Switzerland), and third countries (cf. Annex 5). Annex 6 provides an overview comparing the first six months of 2017 and 2018. A depiction of the 20 countries of destination with the highest values for single-transaction export licences, including a description of the goods, is attached as Annex 7.

The government's policy on the export of military equipment is based on careful case-by-case scrutiny. A generalised numbers-based analysis on the basis of the pure licensing values for a reference period is not a useful means of assessing how restrictive the policy on exports of military equipment is. Any such assessment requires a case-based evaluation of licensing decisions in terms of the country of destination, the type of military equipment, and the envisaged use for the equipment. As before, it is necessary to bear in mind that the definition of military equipment embraces a wide range of goods which extends beyond the terms generally used in the public debate such as "weapons" or "tanks". For example, exports of military equipment can include mine-clearing equipment, security glass to protect embassies against terrorist attacks, or supplies to United Nations peace missions.

Also, an objective view must bear in mind that large orders regularly result in substantial fluctuations in the licensing figures.

In the reference period, single-transaction export licences for military equipment worth a total of approx. €2.57 billion were issued (same period in 2017: approx. €3.53 billion).

#### EU, NATO and NATO-equivalent countries

Of this, licences worth approx. €1.03 billion (same period in 2017: approx. €1.53 billion) and thus 40.05% went to EU, NATO and NATO-equivalent countries, i.e. countries to which – according to the Political Principles of the Federal Government – the export of military equipment should not in principle be restricted.

#### **Third countries**

In the reference period, licences worth a total of approximately €1.54 billion were issued for exports to third countries (same period in 2017: approximately €2 billion). Of these countries, Algeria accounted for the highest amount of exports in terms of value.

#### Small arms

The total value of the licences for exports of small arms (Annexes 8 and 9) amounted to approximately  $\leq 14.8$  million in the reference period (same period in 2017:  $\leq 31.7$  million). Of this only a share of  $\leq 16,905$  was for licences for exports outside EU, NATO and NATO-equivalent countries.

#### **Collective export licences**

The value of the 6 collective export licences newly issued in the reference period amounted to €13.6 million.

Collective export licences are also issued on the basis of case-by-case scrutiny (Section 8 Foreign Trade and Payments Act in conjunction with Section 4 Foreign Trade and Payments Ordinance); these licensing decisions are covered by the same political principles as govern individual licences. Collective licences are mainly issued in connection with defence cooperation between EU and NATO partners. The collective export licences primarily refer to the production phase of an item of military equipment, during which military equipment is frequently imported and exported in the context of the industrial collaboration. Also, movements of equipment relating to maintenance and repair are handled via collective export licences. The licences can be used both for temporary and for final exports. They permit any number of movements of goods up to a certain value based on the likely need to export the goods in the course of the multiple movements. The collective export licences are issued for a maximum value. There are varying degrees of take-up of the approved maximum value; it does not provide any indication of actual shipments of goods - not least because reimports are not discounted. Equating collective export licences with individual export licences or actual exports, or adding up the figures, therefore makes no sense for systemic reasons.

#### **Export licence denials**

In the reference period, 44 applications with a total value of €29.4 million were rejected.

The data published in this half-year report regarding licences in the period from 1 January 2018 until 30 June 2018 will be included in the Military Equipment Report for 2018, which will appear in the summer of 2019.

Political Principles Adopted by the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany for the Export of War Weapons and Other Military Equipment

## The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany, desiring

- to pursue a restrictive policy on arms exports,
- with regard to the international and statutory obligations of the Federal Republic of Germany, to gear arms exports to Germany's security needs and foreign policy interests,
- through the restriction and control of such exports to contribute to safeguarding peace, preventing the threat or use of force, securing respect for human rights and promoting sustainable development in all parts of the world,
- hence to take account also of decisions adopted by inter-national institutions with a view to disarmament and designed to restrict the international arms trade,
- to press for such decisions to be made legally binding at the international as well as the European level,

has modified its principles for the export of war weapons and other military equipment as follows:

## I. General principles

The Federal Government's decisions regarding the export of war weapons<sup>2</sup> and other military equipment<sup>3</sup> are made in accordance with the provisions of the War Weapons Control Act and the Foreign Trade and Payments Act as well as the EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports adopted by the European Council on 8 June 1998<sup>4</sup> and such arrangements as may be agreed subsequently as well as the Principles Governing Conventional Arms Transfers adopted by the Organisation for Security

and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) on 25 November 1993. The criteria laid down in the EU Code of Conduct are an integral part of these Political Principles. The standards stipulated in the Code of Conduct will be superseded by any more stringent standards that may be derived from the following principles:

- The issue of respect for human rights in the countries of destination and end-use is a key factor in deciding whether or not to grant licences for the export of war weapons and other military equipment.
- 3. On principle export licences for war weapons and other military equipment shall not be granted where there are reasonable grounds to suspect that they will be used for internal repression as defined in the EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports or the sustained and systematic abuse of human rights. In this context the assessment of the human rights situation in the recipient country is an important factor to be considered.
- 4. Such assessments will take into account the views of the European Union, the Council of Europe, the United Nations (UN), the OSCE and other international bodies. Reports issued by international human rights organisations will also be taken into consideration.
- 5. The end-use of war weapons and other military equipment must be definitively determined.

4 Attached as Annex 2.

<sup>2</sup> Weapons (complete weapons as well as components classed separately as weapons) listed in the War Weapons List (Annex to the War Weapons Control Act).

<sup>3</sup> Goods specified in Part I, Section A of the Export List (Annex to the Foreign Trade and Payment Ordinance) with the exception of war weapons.

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### II. NATO countries<sup>5</sup>, EU Member States, countries with NATO-equivalent status<sup>6</sup>

1. The export of war weapons and other military equipment to these countries will be geared to the security interests of the Federal Republic of Germany with regard to the Alliance and the European Union.

In principle such exports will not be restricted unless in specific cases this is warranted on particular political grounds.

2. Cooperative ventures in this area should be in the interest of the Alliance and/or European policy.

In the case of coproduction projects covered by intergovernmental agreements with countries referred to in this Section, these arms export principles will be given practical effect as far as possible. While mindful of its special interest in its cooperation standing, the Federal Government will not forgo any opportunities it may have to influence export projects envisaged by its cooperation partners (Section II. 3.).

3. Before concluding any cooperation agreement, a timely joint assessment of its export policy implications is to be made.

To give effect to its arms exports policy principles, the Federal Government reserves the right by way of consultations to object to particular export projects envisaged by its cooperation partners. All new cooperation agreements should therefore aim in principle to incorporate a consultation procedure enabling the Federal Government to raise effectively any objections it might have to exports envisaged by its partner country. In so doing the Federal Government will seek, in the light of the human rights criterion, to strike a balance between its interest in cooperation and its fundamentally restrictive arms exports policy.

4. Before any exports of war weapons or other military equipment involving German components take place, the Federal Foreign Office, the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and the Federal Ministry of Defence, in conjunction with the Federal Chancellery, will evaluate whether in any specific case the relevant conditions for initiating such consultations exist. The Federal Government will raise objections – generally following consideration of the matter by the Federal Security Council – against such exports involving the use of German components in the following cases:

- exports to countries involved in armed conflict, unless such conflict is covered by Article 51 of the UN Charter,
- exports to countries where an outbreak of armed conflict is imminent or where exports may stir up, perpetuate or exacerbate latent tensions and conflicts,
- exports where there are reasonable grounds to suspect they may be used for internal repression as defined by the EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports or the sustained and systematic abuse of human rights,
- exports that would impair vital security interests of the Federal Republic of Germany,
- exports that would impose such a strain on relations with third countries that even Germany's own interest in the cooperative venture and in maintaining good relations with its cooperation partner must rank second.

Objections will not be raised if in the light of the considerations outlined in Section III. 4. to 7. below licences for the export of direct deliveries of war weapons and other military equipment are likely to be granted.

5. In the case of cooperative ventures between German companies and companies in countries referred to in Section II above not covered by intergovernmental agreements, supplies of components will, as with direct deliveries of war weapons and other military equipment to those countries, in principle not be restricted. The Federal Government will, however, as in the case of cooperative ventures covered by intergovernmental agreements, bring its influence to bear in the matter of exports resulting from cooperative ventures between commercial companies.

- 5 Area of application of NATO Treaty, Article 6.
- 6 Australia, Japan, New Zealand, Switzerland.

To that end it will require German cooperative venture partners to enter a contractual obligation that, should they supply components of a quantity or type that could be relevant to the manufacture of war weapons, they will inform the Federal Government in good time as to their partners' export intentions and seek legally binding arrangements on end-use.

6. In the case of German supplies of components (separate components or sub-systems) that constitute war weapons or other military equipment, the partner country is in terms of exports law both purchaser and user. Where such components are built into a weapons system as fixed features, that process in terms of exports law makes the partner country the country of origin of the goods in question.

### **III. Other countries**

- 1. A restrictive policy will be pursued regarding exports of war weapons and other military equipment to countries other than those covered by Section II. Notably the development of additional, specifically export-oriented capacities must be avoided. The Federal Government will not take the initiative to privilege any specific country or region.
- 2. Export licences for war weapons (subject to licensing under the War Weapons Control Act and the Foreign Trade and Payments Act) will not be granted unless in a specific case this is exceptionally warranted on particular foreign and security policy grounds, having due regard to Alliance interests. Labour policy considerations must not be a decisive factor.
- 3. Export licences for other military equipment (subject to licensing under the Foreign Trade and Payments Act) will be granted only where such exports will not prejudice interests that German law on foreign trade and payments serves to protect, namely, security, peace among the nations and Germany's foreign relations.

The protection of these interests takes priority over economic interests as defined in Section 3(1) of the Foreign Trade and Payments Act.

- 4. Export licences pursuant to the War Weapons Control Act and/or the Foreign Trade and Payments Act will not be granted where the internal situation in the country concerned precludes such action, e. g. in the case of armed conflict or where there are reasonable grounds for suspecting such exports may be used for internal repression or the sustained and systematic abuse of human rights. In this context the human rights situation in the recipient country is a major factor to be considered.
- No licences will be granted for the export of war weapons<sup>7</sup> and other military equipment related to war weapons to countries
  - involved in armed conflict or where armed conflict is imminent,
  - in which there is a risk of an outbreak of armed conflict or existing tensions and conflicts would be triggered, maintained or exacerbated by the export.
  - Exports to countries involved in external armed conflicts or where there is a danger such conflicts may erupt are therefore ruled out on principle except in cases covered by Article 51 of the UN Charter.
- Decisions on whether to grant export licences for war weapons and other military equipment will take into account whether sustainable development in the recipient country is being seriously impeded by excessive arms spending.
- 7. Also to be taken into account is the recipient country's conduct in terms of whether it supports and promotes terrorism and international organised crime, complies with international obligations, especially renunciation of the threat or use of force, including obligations under humanitarian law on international or non-international conflicts, has assumed obligations in the area of non-proliferation and other aspects of arms control and disarmament, notably by signing, ratifying and implementing the arms control and disarmament arrangements specified in the EU Code of Conduct on arms exports, supports the UN Arms Register.

### IV. Definitive determination of end-use

- 1. Export licences for war weapons and other military equipment will be granted only on the basis of prior knowledge of definitive end-use in the country of final destination. This will generally require a written assurance by the end-user as well as other appropriate documentation.
- 2. Export licences for war weapons or other military equipment of a quantity and type relevant to war weapons may be granted only on presentation of governmental end-use certificates that preclude re-exports without prior authorisation. This applies mutatis mutandis to any other military equipment related to war weapons exported in connection with a manufacturing licence. For the export of such equipment used for the manufacture of war weapons definitive end-use certificates must be furnished.
- 3. Stringent standards are to be applied in assessing whether the recipient country is capable of carrying out effective export controls.
- 4. War weapons and other military equipment relevant to war weapons may only be re-exported to third countries or transferred inside the EU Internal Market with the written approval of the Federal Government.
- 5. A recipient country that, in breach of an end-use certificate, authorises or does not seek to prevent or sanction the unauthorised re-export of war weapons or other military equipment relevant to war weapons will on principle, as long as such conditions persist, be excluded from receiving any further deliveries of war weapons or other military equipment related to war weapons.

### V. Military Equipment Export Report

The Federal Government will submit to the German Bundestag an annual report on the principle and practice of its arms exports policy listing, in the context of the relevant legislation, the export licences for war weapons and other military equipment it has granted over the past year.

Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP of 8 December 2008 defining common rules governing control of exports of military technology and equipment

### THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Treaty of the European Union, and in particular Article 15 thereof,

#### Whereas:

- Member States intend to build on the Common Criteria agreed at the Luxembourg and Lisbon European Councils in 1991 and 1992, and on the European Union Code of Conduct on Arms Exports adopted by the Council in 1998.
- (2) Member States recognise the special responsibility of military technology and equipment exporting States.
- (3) Member States are determined to set high common standards which shall be regarded as the minimum for the management of, and restraint in, transfers of military technology and equipment by all Member States, and to strengthen the exchange of relevant information with a view to achieving greater transparency.
- (4) Member States are determined to prevent the export of military technology and equipment which might be used for internal repression or international aggression or contribute to regional instability.
- (5) Member States intend to reinforce cooperation and to promote convergence in the field of exports of military technology and equipment within the framework of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).
- (6) Complementary measures have been taken against illicit transfers, in the form of the EU Programme for Preventing and Combating Illicit Trafficking in Conventional Arms.
- (7) The Council adopted on 12 July 2002 Joint Action 2002/589/CFSP<sup>8</sup> on the European Union's contribution to combating the destabilising accumulation and spread of small arms and light weapons.

- (8) The Council adopted on 23 June 2003 Common Position 2003/468/CFSP<sup>9</sup> on the control of arms brokering.
- (9) The European Council adopted in December 2003 a strategy against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and in December 2005 a strategy to combat illicit accumulation and trafficking of SALW and their ammunition, which imply an increased common interest of Member States of the European Union in a coordinated approach to the control of exports of military technology and equipment.
- (10) The UN Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects was adopted in 2001.
- (11) The United Nations Register of Conventional Arms was established in 1992.
- (12) States have a right to transfer the means of self-defence, consistent with the right of self-defence recognised by the UN Charter.
- (13) The wish of Member States to maintain a defence industry as part of their industrial base as well as their defence effort is acknowledged.
- (14) The strengthening of a European defence technological and industrial base, which contributes to the implementation of the Common Foreign and Security Policy, in particular the Common European Security and Defence Policy, should be accompanied by cooperation and convergence in the field of military technology and equipment.
- (15) Member States intend to strengthen the European Union's export control policy for military technology and equipment through the adoption of this Common Position, which updates and replaces the European Union Code of Conduct on Arms Exports adopted by the Council on 8 June 1998.

8 OJ L 191 of 19 July 2002, p. 1.

#### 9 OJ L 156 of 25 June 2003, p. 79.

- (16) On 13 June 2000, the Council adopted the Common Military List of the European Union, which is regularly reviewed, taking into account, where appropriate, similar national and international lists.<sup>10</sup>
- (17) The Union must ensure the consistency of its external activities as a whole in the context of its external relations, in accordance with Article 3, second paragraph of the Treaty; in this respect the Council takes note of the Commission proposal to amend Council Regulation (EC) No 1334/2000 of 22 June 2000 setting up a Community regime for the control of exports of dual use items and technology.<sup>11</sup>

#### HAS ADOPTED THIS COMMON POSITION:

#### Article 1

- Each Member State shall assess the export licence applications made to it for items on the EU Common Military List mentioned in Article 12 on a case-by-case basis against the criteria of Article 2.
- (2) The export licence applications as mentioned in paragraph 1 shall include:
  - applications for licences for physical exports, including those for the purpose of licensed production of military equipment in third countries,
  - applications for brokering licences,
  - applications for "transit" or "transhipment" licences,
  - applications for licences for any intangible transfers of software and technology by means such as electronic media, fax or telephone.

Member States' legislation shall indicate in which case an export licence is required with respect to these applications.

#### Article 2

#### Criteria

(1) **Criterion 1:** Respect for the international obligations and commitments of Member States, in particular the sanctions adopted by the UN Security Council or the European Union, agreements on non-proliferation and other subjects, as well as other international obligations.

An export licence shall be denied if approval would be inconsistent with, inter alia:

- a) the international obligations of Member States and their commitments to enforce United Nations, European Union and Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe arms embargoes;
- b) the international obligations of Member States under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention;
- c) the commitment of Member States not to export any form of anti-personnel landmine;
- d) the commitments of Member States in the framework of the Australia Group, the Missile Technology Control Regime, the Zangger Committee, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Wassenaar Arrangement and The Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation.
- (2) **Criterion 2**: Respect for human rights in the country of final destination as well as respect by that country of international humanitarian law.

Having assessed the recipient country's attitude towards relevant principles established by international human rights instruments, Member States shall:

 a) deny an export licence if there is a clear risk that the military technology or equipment to be exported might be used for internal repression;

10 Last amended on 10 March 2008, OJ C 98 of 18 April 2008, p. 1. 11 OJ L 159 of 30 June 2000, p. 1.  b) exercise special caution and vigilance in issuing licences, on a case-by-case basis and taking account of the nature of the military technology or equipment, to countries where serious violations of human rights have been established by the competent bodies of the United Nations, by the European Union or by the Council of Europe;

For these purposes, technology or equipment which might be used for internal repression will include, inter alia, technology or equipment where there is evidence of the use of this or similar technology or equipment for internal repression by the proposed end-user, or where there is reason to believe that the technology or equipment will be diverted from its stated end-use or end-user and used for internal repression. In line with Article 1 of this Common Position, the nature of the technology or equipment will be considered carefully, particularly if it is intended for internal security purposes. Internal repression includes, inter alia, torture and other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment, summary or arbitrary executions, disappearances, arbitrary detentions and other major violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms as set out in relevant international human rights instruments, including the Universal Declaration on Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Having assessed the recipient country's attitude towards relevant principles established by instruments of international humanitarian law, Member States shall:

- c) deny an export licence if there is a clear risk that the military technology or equipment to be exported might be used in the commission of serious violations of international humanitarian law.
- (3) **Criterion 3**: Internal situation in the country of final destination, as a function of the existence of tensions or armed conflicts.

Member States shall deny an export licence for military technology or equipment which would provoke or prolong armed conflicts or aggravate existing tensions or conflicts in the country of final destination. (4) **Criterion 4**: Preservation of regional peace, security and stability.

Member States shall deny an export licence if there is a clear risk that the intended recipient would use the military technology or equipment to be exported aggressively against another country or to assert by force a territorial claim. When considering these risks, Member States shall take into account inter alia:

- a) the existence or likelihood of armed conflict between the recipient and another country;
- b) a claim against the territory of a neighbouring country which the recipient has in the past tried or threatened to pursue by means of force;
- c) the likelihood of the military technology or equipment being used other than for the legitimate national security and defence of the recipient;
- d) the need not to affect adversely regional stability in any significant way.
- (5) Criterion 5: National security of the Member States and of territories whose external relations are the responsibility of a Member State, as well as that of friendly and allied countries.

Member States shall take into account:

- a) the potential effect of the military technology or equipment to be exported on their defence and security interests as well as those of Member State and those of friendly and allied countries, while recognising that this factor cannot affect consideration of the criteria on respect for human rights and on regional peace, security and stability;
- b) the risk of use of the military technology or equipment concerned against their forces or those of Member States and those of friendly and allied countries.
- (6) Criterion 6: Behaviour of the buyer country with regard to the international community, as regards in particular its attitude to terrorism, the nature of its alliances and respect for international law.

Member States shall take into account, inter alia, the record of the buyer country with regard to:

- a) its support for or encouragement of terrorism and international organised crime;
- b) its compliance with its international commitments, in particular on the non-use of force, and with international humanitarian law;
- c) its commitment to non-proliferation and other areas of arms control and disarmament, in particular the signature, ratification and implementation of relevant arms control and disarmament conventions referred to in point (b) of Criterion 1.
- (7) Criterion 7: Existence of a risk that the military technology or equipment will be diverted within the buyer country or re-exported under undesirable conditions.

In assessing the impact of the military technology or equipment to be exported on the recipient country and the risk that such technology or equipment might be diverted to an undesirable end-user or for an undesirable end use, the following shall be considered:

- a) the legitimate defence and domestic security interests of the recipient country, including any participation in United Nations or other peace-keeping activity;
- b) the technical capability of the recipient country to use such technology or equipment;
- c) the capability of the recipient country to apply effective export controls;
- d) the risk of such technology or equipment being re-exported to undesirable destinations, and the record of the recipient country in respecting any re-export provision or consent prior to re-export which the exporting Member State considers appropriate to impose;
- e) the risk of such technology or equipment being diverted to terrorist organisations or to individual terrorists;

- f) the risk of reverse engineering or unintended technology transfer.
- (8) Criterion 8: Compatibility of the exports of the military technology or equipment with the technical and economic capacity of the recipient country, taking into account the desirability that states should meet their legitimate security and defence needs with the least diversion of human and economic resources for armaments.

Member States shall take into account, in the light of information from relevant sources such as United Nations Development Programme, World Bank, International Monetary Fund and Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development reports, whether the proposed export would seriously hamper the sustainable development of the recipient country. They shall consider in this context the recipient country's relative levels of military and social expenditure, taking into account also any EU or bilateral aid.

#### Article 3

This Common Position shall not affect the right of Member States to operate more restrictive national policies.

#### Article 4

- (1) Member States shall circulate details of applications for export licences which have been denied in accordance with the criteria of this Common Position together with an explanation of why the licence has been denied. Before any Member State grants a licence which has been denied by another Member State or States for an essentially identical transaction within the last three years, it shall first consult the Member State or States which issued the denial(s). If following consultations, the Member State nevertheless decides to grant a licence, it shall notify the Member State or States issuing the denial(s), giving a detailed explanation of its reasoning.
- (2) The decision to transfer or deny the transfer of any military technology or equipment shall remain at the national discretion of each Member State. A denial of a licence is understood to take place when the Member

State has refused to authorise the actual sale or export of the military technology or equipment concerned, where a sale would otherwise have come about, or the conclusion of the relevant contract. For these purposes, a notifiable denial may, in accordance with national procedures, include denial of permission to start negotiations or a negative response to a formal initial enquiry about a specific order.

(3) Member States shall keep such denials and consultations confidential and not use them for commercial advantage.

#### Article 5

Export licences shall be granted only on the basis of reliable prior knowledge of end use in the country of final destination. This will generally require a thoroughly checked enduser certificate or appropriate documentation and/or some form of official authorisation issued by the country of final destination. When assessing applications for licences to export military technology or equipment for the purposes of production in third countries, Member States shall in particular take account of the potential use of the finished product in the country of production and of the risk that the finished product might be diverted or exported to an undesirable end user.

#### Article 6

Without prejudice to Regulation (EC) No 1334/2000, the criteria in Article 2 of this Common Position and the consultation procedure provided for in Article 4 are also to apply to Member States in respect of dual-use goods and technology as specified in Annex I to Regulation (EC) No 1334/2000 where there are serious grounds for believing that the end-user of such goods and technology will be the armed forces or internal security forces or similar entities in the recipient country. References in this Common Position to military technology or equipment shall be understood to include such goods and technology.

#### Article 7

In order to maximise the effectiveness of this Common Position, Member States shall work within the framework of the CFSP to reinforce their cooperation and to promote their convergence in the field of exports of military technology and equipment.

#### Article 8

- Each Member State shall circulate to other Member States in confidence an annual report on its exports of military technology and equipment and on its implementation of this Common Position.
- (2) An EU Annual Report, based on contributions from all Member States, shall be submitted to the Council and published in the "C" series of the Official Journal of the European Union.
- (3) In addition, each Member State which exports technology or equipment on the EU Common Military List shall publish a national report on its exports of military technology and equipment, the contents of which will be in accordance with national legislation, as applicable, and will provide information for the EU Annual Report on the implementation of this Common Position as stipulated in the User's Guide.

#### Article 9

Member States shall, as appropriate, assess jointly through the CFSP framework the situation of potential or actual recipients of exports of military technology and equipment from Member States, in the light of the principles and criteria of this Common Position.

#### Article 10

While Member States, where appropriate, may also take into account the effect of proposed exports on their economic, social, commercial and industrial interests, these factors shall not affect the application of the above criteria.

#### Article 11

Member States shall use their best endeavours to encourage other States which export military technology or equipment to apply the criteria of this Common Position. They shall regularly exchange experiences with those third states applying the criteria on their military technology and equipment export control policies and on the application of the criteria.

### Article 12

Member States shall ensure that their national legislation enables them to control the export of the technology and equipment on the EU Common Military List. The EU Common Military List shall act as a reference point for Member States' national military technology and equipment lists, but shall not directly replace them.

#### Article 13

The User's Guide to the European Code of Conduct on Exports of Military Equipment, which is regularly reviewed, shall serve as guidance for the implementation of this Common Position.

#### Article 14

This Common Position shall take effect on the date of its adoption.

#### Article 15

This Common Position shall be reviewed three years after its adoption.

#### Article 16

This Common Position shall be published in the Official Journal of the European Union.

Done at Brussels, 8 December 2008.

For the Council

The President

**B. KOUCHNER** 

Principles Adopted by the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany for the Issue of Licences for the Export of Small and Light Weapons, Related Ammunition and Corresponding Manufacturing Equipment to Third Countries<sup>12</sup>

Guided by the principles and considerations expressed in the Arms Trade Treaty, the Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP defining common rules governing control of exports of military technology and equipment of 8 December 2008 and the Political Principles Adopted by the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany for the Export of War Weapons and Other Military Equipment of 19 January 2000, on 18 March 2015 the Federal Government adopted, not least with a view to the general global risk of the dissemination of small arms in particular, the following principles for the issue of licences for the export of small arms and light weapons, related ammunition and corresponding manufacturing equipment to third countries:

- The principles follow the definition of "small arms and light weapons" used in the annex to the Joint Action of the EU of 12 July 2002 and include sniper rifles and pump guns.<sup>13</sup>
- 2. In principle no licences to export components and technology to third countries (e.g. in the context of the granting of licences to manufacture) will be granted where such exports would lead to the establishment of a new manufacturing line for small arms and light weapons or the corresponding ammunition.
- 3. In the case of spare and wear-and-tear parts, of replacement machinery of the same type and of consumable material for manufacturing lines exported in the past, consideration will be given to the legal principle of legitimate expectations. For this reason, licences will in principle continue to be issued in future. This shall not apply to exports intended to increase capacity or widen the product range ("upgrading").

- 4. Licences for the export of sniper rifles and pump guns to private end-users in third countries will not be issued in principle.<sup>14</sup>
- 5. Licences for the export of war weapons to non-state bodies in third countries will not be issued in principle.
- 6. The principle of "New for old" will in principle be applied to licences for the export of small arms and light weapons.<sup>15</sup> This means that state recipients of small arms and light weapons must in principle issue a declaration committing them to destroy the small arms and light weapons to be replaced by the new purchase. Where the new purchase covers a plausible increased need and old weapons are therefore not destroyed, a commitment will in principle instead be required stating that the new weapons to be exported will be destroyed when they are taken out of service in future (variant: "New, destroy when discarded"). The willingness to make and comply with such a declaration shall help to determine the decision on whether to license the export. The Federal Government will ensure that the implementation of the principle "New for old" and its variant "New, destroy when discarded" will be monitored.
- 7. The declaration of end-use must also going beyond the existing customary re-export clause – include a commitment that small arms and light weapons, related ammunition or manufacturing equipment will not be transferred in the country of destination without the approval of the Federal Government.
- 8. The Federal Government will advocate the widespread use of the principle "New for old" and its variant "New, destroy when discarded" in the international arena.

<sup>12 &</sup>quot;Third countries" means all countries apart from the EU countries, NATO countries and NATO-equivalent countries (Australia, Japan, New Zealand and Switzerland).

<sup>13</sup> This includes war weapons of nos. 10 and 11 (where these are portable weapons), 29, 30, 31 (where these are portable weapons), 32 (where these are portable weapons), 34, 35 and 37 of the War Weapons List, weapons for caseless ammunition, sniper rifles and pump guns.

<sup>14</sup> This shall not apply to hunting and sporting weapons.

<sup>15</sup> This shall also apply to other military equipment in certain cases.

- 9. Small arms and light weapons must be labelled in a way that is easily recognisable, legible, permanent and, within the bounds of technical possibilities, restorable. The comprehensive labelling of small arms and light weapons manufactured in Germany will be stipulated in law and will observe international obligations.
- 10. In this context, the Federal Government confirms that surplus small arms and light weapons within the field of responsibility of the Federal Armed Forces will in principle be destroyed.

### Key principles for the introduction of post-shipment controls for German exports of military equipment

In addition to the strict application of the Political Principles Adopted by the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany for the Export of War Weapons and Other Military Equipment from 2000, as cited in the Coalition Agreement, the Federal Government also introduced an instrument to conduct selective post-shipment controls for future deliveries of war weapons and other specific firearms to third countries as of 8 July 2015. The Federal Government has supplemented the Foreign Trade and Payments Ordinance correspondingly to embrace the following principles. The intention is to improve end-use verification for military equipment exported from Germany. The new system of post-shipment controls is based on the following principles:

- Post-shipment controls shall initially be carried out within the framework of pilot checks. A standardised procedure shall then be developed in an interministerial process for the checks to be performed in any given year.
- The controls shall be introduced on the basis of end-use certificates in which the foreign state recipients grant Germany the right to perform on-the-spot checks. Third countries as defined by the Political Principles Adopted by the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany for the Export of War Weapons and Other Military Equipment shall be required to submit such end-use certificates.
- The goods to be inspected shall comprise all war weapons and specific types of firearms (pistols, revolvers and sniper rifles) that are destined for state recipients. Of the listed war weapons, the only exceptions are components or assemblies that are to be incorporated into weapons systems abroad.
- The purpose of the controls is to inspect whether the weapons supplied are still present in the recipient country and in the possession of the end-user specified by the end-use certificate. A visual inspection is usually sufficient for this purpose. Random checks shall be made for inspections of large quantities of arms.

- If non-compliance with the end-user certificate is ascertained or on-the-spot checks are refused despite consent given in the end-use certificate, the end-user shall face the consequences set out in Section IV (4) of the Political Principles Adopted by the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany for the Export of War Weapons and Other Military Equipment in 2000.
- In accordance with the Federal Government's organization of responsibilities, the Federal Office for Economic Affairs and Export Control and the respective mission abroad shall be tasked with the preparation and performance of post-shipment controls.
- The funds required for preparing and performing the post-shipment controls (expenditure and personnel requirements) shall be provided from the budgets available to the relevant ministries.
- The Federal Foreign Office shall inform the affected third countries as to the introduction of post-shipment controls.
- The competitiveness of German industry and armaments cooperation with third countries must not be compromised by the post-shipment controls system.
- Germany shall address the system of post-shipment controls at the EU level in order to align national arms export guidelines in the EU in accordance with the aims set out in the coalition agreement. Moreover, the Federal Foreign Office shall advocate the introduction of comparable controls on the part of their partners in the EU and NATO.
- The Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy shall inform the affected German companies about the new system of post-shipment controls and the resulting additional requirements for the end-use certificate.

- The following conditions must first be met in order to ensure the proper functioning of the system of post-shipment controls:
  - Amendment to the Foreign Trade and Payments Ordinance
  - Receipt of export authorisation applications for third countries with an end-use certificate in which the recipient country consents to later on-the-spot checks
  - Information on weapons actually exported to third countries that have consented to an inspection of this nature
  - Determining the third country to be inspected that has received a relevant delivery
  - Performing the inspection
- The instrument shall be evaluated two years after the performance of the first on-the-spot check.

# Export licences for military equipment by country groups and countries for the period from 1 January 2018 until 30 June 2018

#### Single-transaction licences for EU countries

Country	No. of licences	Total value in €
Austria	248	69,225,801
Belgium	111	22,003,758
Bulgaria	10	1,540,818
Croatia	5	108,692
Cyprus (southern)	2	417,270
Czech Republic	51	14,339,790
Denmark	92	10,898,207
Denmark (Faroes)	1	15,960
Denmark (Greenland)	2	23,077
Estonia	6	1,589,343
Finland	28	2,334,990
France	282	49,371,346
France (New Caledonia)	1	592
Greece	49	4,311,215
Hungary	26	13,435,715
Ireland	17	357,618
Italy	215	13,634,617
Latvia	7	527,882
Lithuania	23	55,595,417
Luxembourg	33	10,622,645
Netherlands	249	70,922,627
Poland	63	5,812,669
Portugal	17	1,025,752
Romania	39	16,459,484
Slovakia	9	391,229
Slovenia	12	172,562
Spain	227	39,221,600
Sweden	147	60,564,313
United Kingdom	300	90,403,965
United Kingdom (Gibraltar)	1	11,367
United Kingdom (Cayman Islands)	1	97,200
Total	2,274	555,437,521

## Single-transaction licences for NATO and NATO-equivalent countries

Country	No. of licences	Total value in €
Albania	1	23,240
Australia	198	99,921,081
Canada	187	29,681,830
Iceland	3	100,281
Japan	82	8,900,516
Montenegro	2	50,835
New Zealand	42	3,220,255
Norway	78	15,553,901
Switzerland	470	70,229,309
Turkey	39	10,109,964
United States	733	236,637,230
Total	1,835	474,428,442

### Single-transaction licences for third countries

Country	No. of licences	Total value in €
Afghanistan	12	10,197,667
Algeria	18	642,733,556
Andorra	14	230,154
Argentina	20	3,920,461
Azerbaijan	1	1,800
Bangladesh	3	735,497
Belarus	1	1,199
Bosnia and Herzegovina	16	562,301
Botswana	18	2,395,055
Brazil	97	58,868,541
Brunei Darussalam	1	3,286,490
Cameroon	1	276,500
Cape Verde	1	136,000
Central African Republic	1	73,200
Chad	2	623,795
Chile	33	22,877,761

Single-transaction licences for third countries

Country	No. of licences	Total value in €
China	5	2,712,080
Colombia	12	554,009
Congo, Dem. Republic	2	180,900
Ecuador	8	1,632,269
Egypt	1	2,844,040
El Salvador	1	196,212
Georgia	1	217
Guatemala	1	196,203
Honduras	1	197,157
India	276	28,559,570
Indonesia	30	6,714,939
Iraq	7	721,832
Israel	102	80,426,580
Jordan	1	150,000
Kazakhstan	13	788,455
Kenya	2	397,061
Korea, Republic	246	84,620,095
Kosovo	2	20,445
Kuwait	3	156,492
Kyrgyzstan	1	5,400
Lebanon	5	868,264
Macedonia, Former Yugoslav Republic	2	23,843
Malawi	1	54,160
Malaysia	26	16,780,915
Mali	6	1,409,915
Mauretania	1	96,269
Mauritius	9	143,636
Mexico	9	8,734,562
Moldova	4	76,348
Mongolia	8	54,205
Namibia	8	119,646
Niger	7	3,107,965
Nigeria	5	2,228,056
Oman	39	20,484,606
Pakistan	49	115,120,408
Paraguay	1	252,500

Country	No. of licences	Total value in €
Peru	9	12,585,563
Philippines	2	11,452,530
Qatar	40	37,241,123
Rwanda	1	14,900
Saudi Arabia	5	161,874,673
Serbia	20	104,983,300
Singapore	110	59,818,091
Somalia	6	1,508,723
South Africa	52	4,414,217
South Sudan	1	223,900
Sri Lanka	2	22,216
Syria	1	44,300
Taiwan	13	2,727,405
Tanzania	3	15,307
Thailand	21	10,970,469
Tunisia	4	1,619,513
Turkmenistan	2	15,980
Ukraine	24	1,425,174
United Arab Emirates	1	21,400
Uruguay	4	192,766
Vatican	1	13,365
Viet Nam	3	2,645,251
Zambia	8	34,618
Total	1,467	1,541,414,015

## Collective export licences

Country	No. of licences	Total value in €
Mainly covers EU, NATO and NATO-equivalent countries	6	13,580,000

## Overview: comparison of the first halves of 2017 and 2018

	No. of licences		Total va	alue in €
	1st half of 2017 1st half of 2018		1st half of 2017	1st half of 2018
EU	2,212	2,274	935,147,389	555,437,521
NATO and NATO-equivalent countries	1,923	1,835	590,102,645	474,428,442
Third countries	1,513	1,467	2,001,755,872	1,541,414,015
Total	5,648	5,576	3,527,005,906	2,571,279,978

# Countries of destination with the highest licence values (first half of 2017 compared with first half of 2018)

		First half of 2017			First half of 2018	
	Country	No. of licences	Total value in €	Country	No. of licences	Total value in €
1	Algeria	14	1,025,650,950	Algeria	18	642,733,556
2	Lithuania	20	485,933,446	United States	733	236,637,230
3	United Arab Emirates	41	198,198,547	Saudi Arabia	5	161,874,673
4	United States	729	197,341,230	Pakistan	49	115,120,408
5	Australia	214	192,897,053	Serbia	20	104,983,300
6	Egypt	14	128,092,215	Australia	198	99,921,081
7	Korea, Republic	248	113,650,222	United Kingdom	300	90,403,965
8	Saudi Arabia	34	99,040,482	Korea, Republic	246	84,620,095
9	United Kingdom	348	84,125,888	Israel	102	80,426,580
10	Canada	188	75,549,706	Netherlands	249	70,922,627
11	Indonesia	19	75,244,783	Switzerland	470	70,229,309
12	Switzerland	470	71,405,427	Austria	248	69,225,801
13	France	296	67,529,220	Sweden	147	60,564,313
14	Singapore	123	67,471,873	Singapore	110	59,818,091
15	Austria	214	62,899,582	Brazil	97	58,868,541
16	Tunisia	6	55,913,737	Lithuania	23	55,595,417
17	Netherlands	244	53,948,227	France	282	49,371,346
18	China	10	39,159,597	Spain	227	39,221,600
19	Sweden	122	33,822,872	Qatar	40	37,241,123
20	Italy	200	32,783,623	Canada	187	29,681,830

# Countries of destination with the highest licence values for the period 1 January 2018 to 30 June 2018

The 20 most important countries of destination for which individual export licences were granted in the first half of 2018 were:

Note: The bracketed ranking refers to the first half of 2017.

No.	Country	Value in first half of 2018 in €	Description of articles
1 (1)	Algeria	642,733,556	Trucks and parts for armoured vehicles, trucks (A0006/94.0 %)
2 (4)	United States	236,637,230	Ammunition for grenade launchers, automatic grenade launchers, rifles, hunting weapons, sport- ing weapons, revolvers, pistols, smooth bore hunting weapons, smooth bore sporting weapons and parts for ammunition for guns, cannons, mortars, rifles, machine guns, hunting weapons, sporting weapons, decoys (A0003/25.1%);
			rifles with war weapons list number, submachine guns, rifles without war weapons list number, sniper rifles, revolvers, pistols, hunting rifles, sporting rifles, sporting revolvers, sporting pistols, self-loading rifles, pump guns, silencers, gun mountings, magazines, flash suppressors, weapon sights and parts for rifles with war weapons list number, submachine guns, machine guns, sniper rifles,
			revolvers, pistols, hunting rifles, sporting rifles, sporting revolvers, sporting pistols, self-loading rifles, self-loading hunting rifles, silencers, magazines, flash suppressors, weapon sights (A0001/20.8 %);
			communications equipment, electronic reconnaissance system, measuring equipment, testing equipment, assemblies, components, encryption equipment and parts for electronic equipment, communications equipment, electronic reconnaissance sys- tems, assemblies, positioning equipment, navigation equipment, electricity supplies (A0011/13.5%);
			forged, cast and unfinished components (A0016/10.0%);
			engines, retarder parachutes and parts for combat aircraft, combat helicopters, aircraft, helicopters, unmanned aircraft, engines, in-flight refuelling equipment, parachutes (A0010/8.1%);
			target acquisition systems, target range-finding systems and parts for fire control equipment, on-board weapons-control systems, target acquisition sys- tems, radar equipment (A0005/7.8%)
3 (8)	Saudi Arabia	161,874,673	Patrol boats and parts for patrol boats (A0009/99.9 %)
4 (25)	Pakistan	115,120,408	Maritime patrol and torpedo aircraft, launch equipment for unmanned aircraft and parts for combat aircraft, aircraft, helicopters, unmanned aircraft, ground equipment (A0010/52.9%);
			communications equipment, guidance equipment and parts for communications equipment, radar reconnaissance equipment, measuring equipment, testing equipment, travelling wave tubes, positioning equipment, navigation equipment, guidance equipment, electricity supplies (A0011/31.4%)
5 (76)	Serbia	104,983,300	Combat helicopters, helicopters and parts for helicopters (A0010/99.9%)
6 (5)	Australia	99,921,081	Trucks and parts for armoured vehicles, ground vehicles (A0006/58.6%);
			ammunition for grenade launchers, automatic grenade launchers, smoke dischargers and ammunition parts for howitzers, hunting weapons and sporting weapons (A0003/15.6%);
			communications equipment and parts for friend-or-foe identification, communications equipment, positioning equipment, electricity supplies (A0011/15.0%)

No.	Country	Value in first half of 2018 in €	Description of articles
7 (9)	United Kingdom	90,403,965	Ammunition parts for howitzers, cannons, mortars, decoys, grenade launchers and automatic grenade launchers (A0003/49.1%);
			parts for combat aircraft, combat helicopters, aircraft, helicopters, engines, in-flight refuelling equipment, ground equipment and ejection seats (A0010/17.7%);
			communications equipment, electronic reconnaissance system, measuring equipment, testing equipment, assemblies, navigation equipment, encryption equipment and parts for electronic equipment, communications equipment, electronic reconnaissance systems, assemblies, positioning equipment (A0011/13.7%)
8 (7)	Korea, Republic	84,620,095	Submarine diesel engines, ship body conduits and parts for submarines, combat vessels, ships, submarine diesel engines, underwater detection equipment, ship body conduits (A0009/49.1%);
			parts for main battle tanks, armoured self-propelled howitzers, armoured recovery vehicles, armoured vehicles, trucks and ground vehicles (A0006/21.6%);
			magnetic self-protection units, communications equipment, navigation equipment, components and parts for communications equipment, positioning equipment, navigation equipment,
9 (26)	Israel	80,426,580	electricity supplies (A0011/9.7%) Parts for main battle tanks, armoured vehicles, trucks and ground vehicles (A0006/92.3%)
	Netherlands	70,922,627	Trucks, cross-country vehicles and parts for main battle tanks, armoured self-propelled howitzers, armoured vehicles (A0006/62.0%);
			ammunition for cannons, submachine guns and parts for mortar ammunition (A0003/16.7 %);
			ammunition for weapons training devices and parts for weapons training devices, ammunition for weapons training devices (A0014/8.3 %)
11 (12)	Switzerland	70,229,309	Ammunition for cannons, mortars, grenade launchers, automatic grenade launchers, submachine guns, smoke dischargers and parts for ammunition for cannons, mortars, anti-tank weapons, grenade launchers, automatic grenade launchers, pyrotechnic launchers, smoke grenades (A0003/38.9%);
			semi-trailers and parts for main battle tanks, armoured self-propelled howitzers, armoured vehicles, trucks, ground vehicles (A0006/23.0%);
			smoke hand grenades, simulator ammunition and parts for smoke grenades, missiles, hand grenades, training hand grenades, spectrally balanced decoys (A0004/8.0%);
			forged, cast and unfinished components (A0016/7.1%);
			software for military equipment (A0021/5.8 %)
12 (15)	Austria	69,225,801	Trucks and parts for main battle tanks, armoured vehicles, trucks, cross-country vehicles (A0006/78.7 %);
			forged, cast and unfinished components (A0016/14.3 %)
13 (19)	Sweden	60,564,313	Radio trigger system, missile warning system and parts for missile warning systems (A0004/76.3%);
			gun laying equipment, target range-finding systems and parts for fire control equipment, target range-finding systems (A0005/7.1%)
14 (14)	Singapore	59,818,091	Parts for main battle tanks, armoured vehicles, amphibious vehicles and ground vehicles (A0006/88.0%)

No.	Country	Value in first half of 2018 in €	Description of articles
15 (33)	Brazil	58,868,541	Missile defence systems for aircraft and parts for missile-defence systems for aircraft (A0004/51.2%);
			parts for submarines and submarine diesel engines (A0009/17.9%);
			flight simulators and parts for flight simulators (A0014/17.4%)
16 (2)	Lithuania	55,595,417	Missiles and parts for missiles (A0004/70.3 %);
			trucks, cross-country vehicle and parts for armoured self-propelled howitzers, armoured vehicles (A0006/22.4%)
17 (13)	France	49,371,346	Rifles with war weapons list number, submachine guns and parts for rifles with war weapons list number, submachine guns (A0001/22.3 %);
			communications equipment, measuring equipment, testing equipment, assemblies, components, electricity supplies, encryption equipment
			and parts for electronic equipment, communications equipment, assemblies, positioning equipment, navigation equipment, encryption equipment (A0011/15.2%);
			target range-finders, testing equipment and parts for fire control equipment, target range-finding systems, target surveillance systems, target tracking systems and positioning systems (A0005/14.8 %);
			ground support equipment and parts for combat aircraft, combat helicopters, aircraft, helicopters, unmanned aircraft, engines, ground equipment, tanker equipment, ejection seats, life support systems (A0010/11.5 %);
			ammunition for grenade launchers, automatic grenade launchers and parts for ammunition for guns, howitzers, cannons, mortars, grenade launchers, automatic grenade launchers (A0003/10.8%);
			forged, cast and unfinished components (A0016/9.4%)
18 (29)	Spain	39,221,600	Ground support equipment and parts for combat aircraft, combat helicopters, aircraft, helicopters, in-flight refuelling equip- ment, ground support equipment (A0010/42.5 %);
			forged, cast and unfinished components (A0016/18.1%);
			communications equipment, measuring equipment, testing equipment, guidance equipment,
			encryption equipment and parts for electronic equipment, communications equipment, assemblies, navigation equipment (A0011/16.8%);
			parts for attack simulators and flight simulators (A0014/6.8%)
19 (45)	Qatar	37,241,123	Armoured vehicles and parts for armoured vehicles (A0006/39.6%);
			parts for combat aircraft, helicopters and engines (A0010/12.9%);
			radar simulator and parts for radar simulators (A0014/12.8%);
			infrared equipment (A0015/10.0%);
			cathode ray tubes and parts for navigation equipment (A0011/9.7%)

No.	Country	Value in first half of 2018 in €	Description of articles
20 (10)	Canada	29,681,830	Forged and unfinished components (A0016/41.4%); rifles with war weapons list number, revolvers, pistols, hunting rifles, sporting rifles, self-loading rifles, repeating smooth bore weapons, gun mounts, magazines, flash suppressors, weapon sights
			rifles with war weapons list number, revolvers, pistols, hunting rifles, sporting rifles, self-loading rifles, repeating smooth bore weapons, gun mounts, magazines, flash suppressors, weapon sights and parts for rifles with war weapons list number, submachine guns, rifles without war weapons list number, revolvers, pistols, hunting rifles, sporting rifles, sporting pistols, self-loading rifles,
			magazines, weapon sights (A0001/12.5%); parts for main battle tanks, armoured vehicles and ground vehicles (A0006/11.5%);
			ammunition for rifles, hunting weapons, sporting weapons, revolvers, pistols, smooth bore hunting weapons, smooth bore sporting weapons
			and parts for ammunition for guns, howitzers, cannons, rifles, machine guns, revolvers, pistols, illumination (A0003/7.8 %);
			technology for military equipment (A0022/7.0%)

## I. Overview of licences for small arms in the first half of 2017 and in the first half of 2018 by country group

"Small arms" comprises: rifles with war weapons list number (semi and fully automatic rifles), submachine guns, machine guns, smooth-bore guns for military purposes, weapons for caseless ammunition and parts for such weapons (Other small arms are excluded: rifles without war weapons list number, revolvers, pistols, sniper rifles, inoperative weapons, hunting rifles, sporting pistols and revolvers, sporting rifles, semi-automatic hunting and sporting rifles and other smooth-bore guns)

### Licences for small arms:

	First half of 2017	First half of 2018
EU countries	€19,231,840	€13,491,105
(of which components)	(€2,624,902)	(€1,174,572)
NATO and NATO-equi- valent countries (of which components)	€4,254,124 (€3,864,193)	€1,312,242 (€961,375)
Third countries	€8,184,084	€16,905
(of which components)	(€1,829,686)	(€3,540)
Total	€31,670,048	€14,820,252
(of which components)	(€8,318,781)	(€2,139,487)

## II. Overview of licences for small arms ammunition in the first half of 2017 and in the first half of 2018 by country group

"Small arms ammunition" comprises ammunition for: guns, submachine guns, machine guns and parts for such weapons

(Not included: ammunition for revolvers, pistols, hunting and sporting weapons and smooth-bore guns)

### Licences for small arms ammunition:

	First half of 2017	First half of 2018
EU countries	€6,338,462	€320,518
(of which components)	(€601,472)	(€105,477)
NATO and NATO-equi- valent countries (of which components)	€8,485,012 (€5,654,508)	€1,410,934 (€596,583)
Third countries	€410,391	€95,650
(of which components)	(€2,765)	(€0)
Total	€15,233,865	€1,827,102
(of which components)	(€6,258,745)	(€702,060)

### Licences for small arms for third countries in the first half of 2018

"Small arms" comprises: rifles with war weapons list number (semi and fully automatic rifles), submachine guns, machine guns, smooth-bore guns for military purposes, weapons for caseless ammunition and parts for such weapons (Other small arms are excluded: rifles without war weapons list number, revolvers, pistols, sniper rifles, inoperative weapons, hunting rifles, sporting pistols and revolvers, sporting rifles, semi-automatic hunting and sporting rifles and other smooth-bore guns)

Country	Licences Total	EL position	Value (€)	Description of articles	Quantity
Central African Republic	1	0001A-05	3,540	Parts for submachine guns [UN mission]	12
The Vatican	1	0001A-02 0001A-05	9,840 3,525	Rifles with war weapons list number; Submachine guns	6 3
Total	2		16,905		

## Annex 10

## Licences for small arms ammunition for third countries in the first half of 2018

"Small arms ammunition" comprises ammunition for: guns, submachine guns, machine guns and parts for such weapons

(Not included: ammunition for revolvers, pistols, hunting and sporting weapons and smooth-bore guns)

Country	Licences Total	EL position	Value (€)	Description of articles	Quantity
Algeria	1	0003A-01	2,000	Ammunition for rifles (war weapons number: none)	500
Central African Republic	1	0003A-01	26,850	Ammunition for rifles (war weapons number: none) [UN mission]	55,000
Lebanon	1	0003A-01	16,800	Ammunition for rifles (war weapons number: none) [UN mission]	40,000
Mauritius	1	0003A-01	50,000	Ammunition for rifles (war weapons number: none)	200,000
Total	4		95,650		



